Files
tidewall/test/net/parser_fuzz.gd.uid
claudeandClaude Opus 5.5 9e653f213c N9: Server-side cheat and abuse protection
- A hostile test client crafts INPUT packets byte by byte and sends them
  through NetGame.take_input() into a real match: extreme axes, the same
  tick claimed repeatedly, the whole lead window at once, past, far-future
  and maximum ticks, fire toggled every tick with slot swaps, builds aimed
  anywhere with junk kinds and materials and no materials, and
  pickup/drop/select tricks. Speed stays within sprint speed per tick,
  shots within the weapon's rate, pieces within build reach and paid for,
  and every item is conserved.
- Fix: a command tick beyond the simulation's lead window no longer moves
  NetGame's dedupe marker, so one bogus far-future tick can't lock out a
  player's real commands.
- Connections are rate-limited per address (32 per 10 s, 8 handshakes in
  progress) with a new REASON_BUSY and a message for it.
- ParserFuzz mutates real messages from a bot match and random bytes and
  feeds them to every network decoder, the snapshot receiver and the list
  server. 20,000 per make check; make fuzz runs 1,000,000 (about 40 s):
  no errors, 2.9 KB of memory growth.
- ARCHITECTURE.md: "Trusting nothing from clients".

Closes #40

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-12 17:49:54 -05:00

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