# Security review (H5) Reviewed on 2026-11-14 against commit `e3c0d28` plus the fixes below. Tidewall has no accounts, payments, chat or user-generated files, so the review is mostly about two things: a hostile peer must not crash a server, corrupt a match or lock people out, and the public repository must not leak anything about the machines it is built on. Severity follows the usual scale. **High** and **critical** findings are fixed, with regression tests. Lower ones are fixed when the fix is small and safe, and otherwise recorded here as accepted, with the reason. ## Scope | Area | Files | How it was checked | |---|---|---| | Game handshake and transport | `src/net/net_protocol.gd`, `net_server.gd`, `net_client.gd`, `source_limiter.gd` | Read; `test/net/test_net_handshake.gd` (20 tests, 4 new) | | Player input | `src/net/net_snapshot.gd` (`decode_input`), `src/sim/player_command.gd`, `src/server/net_game.gd`, the simulation's use of each command field | Read every use of `selection`, `material`, `view_lag`, `tick`; `test/server/test_hostile_client.gd` | | Server-to-client messages | `net_snapshot.gd`, `net_world.gd`, `net_fx.gd`, `net_feed.gd` | Read; `make fuzz` | | LAN discovery and list server | `src/net/net_discovery.gd`, `src/server/server_beacon.gd`, `list_server.gd` | Read; `test/net/test_net_discovery.gd`, `test/server/test_list_server.gd` | | Health endpoint | `src/server/health_server.gd` | Read; `test/server/test_health_server.gd` | | Server configuration and files | `src/server/server_config.gd`, `command_log.gd`, `src/client/game_settings.gd`, `input_settings.gd`, `key_bindings.gd` | Read; `test_command_log.gd` (1 new test) | | Packaging | `packaging/docker/`, `packaging/systemd/`, `packaging/server/`, `packaging/dist/` | Read; `make server-package-check` covers non-root and read-only | | Repository contents | every tracked file and the whole git history | `git grep` and `git log -p` for keys, passwords, tokens, private and internal addresses, host names and home paths | ## Findings ### H5-1 High, fixed: one address could hold every connection slot ENet has a fixed number of peer slots, and a peer keeps its slot until ENet hears it leave or times it out (5 to 15 s). The server turned every unwanted peer away with `peer_disconnect_later`, which waits for the REJECT to be acknowledged. A client that connects and then stops answering never acknowledges, so: - each connection refused for flooding (`REASON_BUSY`) kept its slot for up to 15 s, and a single address could open them faster than they expired, until the server had no slots left and real players' connections were silently dropped; - silent guests (8 per address, each for the 5 s handshake timeout) did the same from four addresses. **Fix** (`NetServer`): - A connection refused for flooding is dropped at once with `peer_disconnect_now`; the reason travels as the disconnect's data. `NetClient` now accepts `REASON_BUSY` from that data (`NetProtocol.is_server_reason`), so the player still reads "Too many connections from your address". - A peer told to leave has `leave_grace_msec` (1 s) to acknowledge, then is cut off. - When the slots run short (one left), peers already told to leave go first, then the guest that has waited longest for its HELLO. An honest client sends HELLO within one round trip, so it is never the oldest guest for long. **Tests:** `test_a_flood_from_one_address_cannot_hold_the_slots`, `test_silent_guests_make_room_for_a_newcomer`, `test_a_peer_that_never_acknowledges_leaving_is_cut_off`, `test_busy_reaches_the_client_without_a_reject_message`. The silent peers in these tests are real ENet hosts that complete the connection and then never service their socket again. ### H5-2 Medium, mitigated: half-open connections from spoofed addresses ENet takes a slot for each CONNECT it receives and answers it, before the sender has shown it can receive at that address. The slot is held for ENet's own timeout, and the script is never told about it (Godot reports a peer only once the handshake completes), so nothing in GDScript can see or evict it. Someone able to send packets with forged source addresses could keep every slot half-open with a few packets a second, and each answer goes to the forged address. This is a property of ENet, not of Tidewall's code, and fixing it properly would mean changing the engine. **Mitigation:** the server now creates 512 ENet slots whatever its player limit (`NetServer.peer_slots`), so filling them takes hundreds of forged packets every few seconds instead of a few dozen. The per-source limits and the eviction in H5-1 still govern every connection that completes. This has not been tested against a real spoofing attack: the tests can't forge source addresses. A public server operator's best protection is a network that drops forged packets and an upstream per-source rate limit. ### H5-3 Medium, fixed: one IPv6 connection counted as millions of senders `SourceLimiter` and the per-address caps keyed on the full address. An ordinary IPv6 connection is given a whole /64, so one user could rotate addresses to get a fresh allowance each time, fill the limiter's table of 4,096 sources (locking everyone else out for the rest of the window), take the list server's 256 entries (every address there can answer its own CHALLENGE), or hold more handshakes than the per-address cap. **Fix:** `SourceLimiter.source_of()` maps an IPv6 address to its /64 (and an IPv4-mapped address to the IPv4 address). The limiter, the server's handshakes per source and the list server's entries per address all count by source. **Tests:** `test/net/test_source_limiter.gd` (3 tests). Accepted: someone holding many /64s (a /48 has 65,536) or many IPv4 addresses can still fill the list server or the limiter's table. The list server is optional, self-hosted and has nothing to steal; entries expire in 45 s. ### H5-4 Low, fixed: a damaged replay file could raise script errors `CommandLog.from_bytes` checks every length, but took JSON values with `int()` without checking their type, so a hand-edited header holding an array or object where a number belongs raised an engine error instead of being refused. Replay files are only read from a path given on the command line, so this was never reachable from the network. **Fix:** only numbers and booleans are read. **Test:** `test_a_header_with_the_wrong_types_is_refused_without_errors`. ### H5-5 Low, accepted: a server can make a client spend memory A client trusts the server it chose to join for the size of the world: every WORLD, SNAPSHOT, FX and FEED message is length-checked and validated (and fuzzed), but a hostile server could still send many valid pieces or large reliable messages (ENet's limit is 32 MB a packet). The player picked the server, and the worst case is the game running out of memory or being closed. Not worth bounding further for v1.0. ### H5-6 Low, accepted: names are not authenticated There are no accounts, so anyone can join under any name. Names are cleaned (control, formatting, bidirectional and private-use characters removed, 16 characters) and made unique on the server with a number. The UI never interprets markup in names (no BBCode-enabled labels exist in `src/`). ### H5-7 Low, accepted: claimed view lag A command says how far behind the shooter was seeing (`view_lag`), and the server rewinds other players by that much when judging a hit. A modified client can always claim the maximum, `Tuning.LAG_COMPENSATION_MAX_TICKS` (15 ticks, 0.5 s). This is the usual trade-off of lag compensation and is bounded. Nothing else in a command can claim a position, hit, target or item (see "Trusting nothing from clients" in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md). ### H5-8 Info: release builds stop on a null call Godot release templates end the process (exit 139) on a GDScript call on null, where a debug build reports an error and carries on. A remote input that reached such a call would therefore stop a packaged server. The parsers and the simulation are fuzzed and tested in debug builds, where any script error fails the run, and the server packages restart on failure (`Restart=on-failure`, `restart: unless-stopped`). Recorded so a future crash report is read with this in mind. ### H5-9 Info: the container base image is not pinned by digest `packaging/docker/Dockerfile` starts `FROM debian:13`. A rebuild picks up Debian's security updates, which is what a server image wants, at the cost of exact reproducibility. The engine inside is checked against `tools/engine.sha512`. ## Checked and found sound - **Handshake.** One HELLO per guest, exact lengths, strict UTF-8 (overlong forms and surrogates refused), a 96-byte cap, nothing on the control channel after joining, 32 game packets per player per poll. - **Input.** An INPUT has an exact length and at most `MAX_INPUT_COMMANDS` commands. Every field is clamped on decode. A tick behind the last one taken, or more than `MAX_COMMAND_LEAD_TICKS` ahead, is ignored. `selection` is bounds-checked in `Inventory.select` and `Building.target` (which returns null, handled by `Building.check`), `material` by `Materials.is_valid`, `view_lag` clamped in `Weapons`. - **Discovery and list server.** No answer is larger than the 512-byte QUERY that asked for it, so neither can amplify a forged request; a REGISTER is answered with a smaller CHALLENGE. The token is a SHA-256 of a per-start random secret, address and port, so a server can only be listed at an address where it receives. A server's CHALLENGE handling only accepts one from a list server it chose. Both rate-limit each source and bound packets handled per frame. - **Health endpoint.** Loopback by default, at most 8 connections, 2 KiB and 2 s per request, `GET /health` only, no input reflected in the answer. The Docker health check talks to it on loopback inside the container. - **Configuration.** Unknown or malformed options are errors; a config file can't include another; `--health-bind` must be an IP address; server names are cleaned like player names. Files are read only from paths the operator gives. - **Client settings.** Read with `ConfigFile` from the player's own `user://`, each value type-checked with a fallback. - **Packaging.** The Docker service runs as an unprivileged user with a read-only root, all capabilities dropped and `no-new-privileges`; only the game port is published. The systemd unit uses `DynamicUser`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, `ProtectHome`, `PrivateDevices`, an empty capability set and restricted address families. The launcher quotes its arguments and keeps engine state in its own directory. - **Repository.** No keys, passwords, tokens, internal host names, private network addresses or home paths in any tracked file or in history. Example addresses use the documentation ranges (192.0.2.0/24, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, 2001:db8::/32); one test fixture that used 10.0.0.9 now uses 192.0.2.9. Every commit is authored by the project's own identity. ## Not covered - No external penetration test or review by a second person. - Nothing was tested against forged source addresses (H5-2) or over a real WAN. - Godot and ENet themselves were not audited; the engine is the official 4.7.2 build, checked against its published SHA-512 sums.