N9: Server-side cheat and abuse protection

- A hostile test client crafts INPUT packets byte by byte and sends them
  through NetGame.take_input() into a real match: extreme axes, the same
  tick claimed repeatedly, the whole lead window at once, past, far-future
  and maximum ticks, fire toggled every tick with slot swaps, builds aimed
  anywhere with junk kinds and materials and no materials, and
  pickup/drop/select tricks. Speed stays within sprint speed per tick,
  shots within the weapon's rate, pieces within build reach and paid for,
  and every item is conserved.
- Fix: a command tick beyond the simulation's lead window no longer moves
  NetGame's dedupe marker, so one bogus far-future tick can't lock out a
  player's real commands.
- Connections are rate-limited per address (32 per 10 s, 8 handshakes in
  progress) with a new REASON_BUSY and a message for it.
- ParserFuzz mutates real messages from a bot match and random bytes and
  feeds them to every network decoder, the snapshot receiver and the list
  server. 20,000 per make check; make fuzz runs 1,000,000 (about 40 s):
  no errors, 2.9 KB of memory growth.
- ARCHITECTURE.md: "Trusting nothing from clients".

Closes #40

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-11-12 17:49:54 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent f795ee3fa5
commit 9e653f213c
15 changed files with 573 additions and 2 deletions
+30
View File
@@ -177,6 +177,36 @@ during results, becomes a watcher (`Match.watch()`): they spectate a living play
and take a place ahead of any bots when the next lobby opens. The server still turns
people away when `NetServer.max_players` people are connected.
## Trusting nothing from clients
Tidewall is open source, so anyone can build a client that sends whatever bytes it
likes. The server's defences, and the tests that attack them
(`test/server/test_hostile_client.gd`, `test/net/test_net_handshake.gd`,
`test/net/test_parser_fuzz.gd`, `make fuzz`):
- **Intent only.** A command carries movement axes, look, buttons, a slot, a
material and a view lag. There is no position, velocity, hit, target or item in
it, so speed, teleport, aimbot-by-claim and duplication can't even be expressed.
Every field is clamped on decode, and the simulation applies its own limits:
sprint speed, the weapon's fire interval, build reach (`Tuning.BUILD_RANGE`) and
material cost, pickup reach, one pickup or drop per press, lag compensation at
most `Tuning.LAG_COMPENSATION_MAX_TICKS`.
- **One command per tick.** Each tick's command is taken once, the first time it
arrives. A tick already past or more than `Tuning.MAX_COMMAND_LEAD_TICKS` ahead is
ignored, and a far-future tick can't move the dedupe marker and lock out the real
ones.
- **Bounded messages.** An INPUT has at most `NetSnapshot.MAX_INPUT_COMMANDS`
commands and an exact length, or it is dropped whole. At most 32 game packets per
player are kept per poll. Anything on the control channel after the handshake is
dropped.
- **Bounded connections.** At most 32 new connections per address per 10 s and 8
handshakes in progress per address (`REASON_BUSY`), a 5 s handshake timeout, and
ENet's own peer limit.
- **Parsers.** Every decoder refuses malformed input by returning an empty result,
never by raising an error. `make fuzz` feeds 1,000,000 mutated and random messages
to all of them, the snapshot receiver and the list server, and checks for engine
errors and memory growth.
## Snapshot format
`NetSnapshot` (`src/net/`) owns the layouts. An entity travels as a **record**: a list