Wallet subaddress creation with retry recovery
This commit is contained in:
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The operator has authorized proceeding with implementation instead of the previo
|
||||
|
||||
**Financial storage update:** [ADR 003](postgres-financial-storage.md) selects PostgreSQL and records the integrated asynchronous custody backend, restricted runtime/schema roles, deferred accounting constraints, explicit SQLite freeze/import, and full dump/restore rehearsal. SQLite remains an opt-in-compatible local sandbox default, not an automatic fallback. Real custody and production operating acceptance remain blocked.
|
||||
|
||||
**Read-only Monero observation and allocation-registry groundwork:** [server/market/monero-observer.ts](../server/market/monero-observer.ts) defines a narrow mainnet wallet-RPC client for mainnet primary-address verification and bounded incoming-transfer scans. It requires explicit opt-in and a protected external config file, uses authenticated requests with strict HTTPS/literal-loopback-only HTTP, no redirects, bounded response/deadline, JSON-RPC request-ID validation and lossless JSON integer handling. Each observed transfer includes its validated destination address. It exposes no subaddress creation, credit posting, transfer construction, relay, sweep or withdrawal operation and is not wired into server startup/routes. [server/market/monero-observation-store.ts](../server/market/monero-observation-store.ts) persists scan manifests, exact incoming-transfer observations, cursor progress and append-only seen/changed/not-seen/reappeared events. **PostgreSQL schema v3** adds [server/market/monero-deposit-allocation-store.ts](../server/market/monero-deposit-allocation-store.ts), which can durably reserve a unique subaddress index for a beneficiary before a future wallet side effect and register a validated mainnet subaddress once. Reservations and beneficiary/index bindings cannot be deleted or reassigned; a registered address cannot be replaced. The registry is currently unreachable to both the custody API and observer roles, and the store is not wired to startup, routes, UI or wallet RPC. A wallet-generation UUID/fingerprint supplied to this groundwork is not proof of wallet ownership. It does not solve wallet-RPC/database crash reconciliation or establish the pinned RPC's per-output identity model. Confirmation growth updates an observation projection without emitting an event every poll. A missing output is only a review signal; no automatic journal posting, debit, reversal or customer credit exists. Schema v1→v3 is an explicit additive migration, not an HTTP-runtime migration. The final disposable PostgreSQL suite passed **35/35**, covering v1/v2 upgrades, concurrent reservations across independent pools, idempotency, immutable registration, role isolation and zero journal postings. The offline suite passed **183/183**, and the test-target build succeeded. No wallet endpoint, credentials or funds were accessed. This is not a working deposit-address allocator, live deposit processor, or approved mainnet switch. The application only calls read methods, but operators must still use a restricted view-only wallet RPC instance/account; the code cannot prove credential scope.
|
||||
**Monero observation and deposit-address allocation groundwork:** [server/market/monero-observer.ts](../server/market/monero-observer.ts) keeps the existing observer client strictly read-only: mainnet wallet validation and bounded incoming scans, authenticated requests, strict HTTPS/literal-loopback-only HTTP, no redirects, bounded response/deadline, JSON-RPC ID validation and lossless integer handling. A separate, narrow `createMoneroDepositAddressRpc()` capability can inspect one indexed subaddress or request exactly one labeled subaddress; it exposes no transfer, relay, sweep or withdrawal operation. [server/market/monero-deposit-allocation-store.ts](../server/market/monero-deposit-allocation-store.ts) now combines the PostgreSQL v3 durable beneficiary/index reservation with this capability: it reserves first, serializes cooperating allocators per wallet/account, checks the exact reserved index, and recovers a lost `create_address` response by looking up a deterministic allocation label before retrying creation. Address registration is immutable and performed only after the wallet returns the expected index/address/label. If another wallet client consumes indexes outside this allocator, the operation fails for reconciliation rather than reassigning an address; the wallet RPC must therefore be dedicated to the allocator. A wallet-generation UUID/fingerprint supplied to this groundwork is not proof of wallet ownership, and the RPC/database crash window has only been fixture-tested. Neither client nor orchestration is wired to startup, routes, UI, deposit scans or financial posting. The registry remains inaccessible to both custody API and observer roles. Observation storage continues to record reorg/reappearance evidence only; no credit, debit, reversal or journal can be posted. Schema v1→v3 is explicit and additive. The test-target build succeeded; **184/184** offline tests and **35/35** disposable PostgreSQL tests passed, including a simulated create-success/response-loss/recovery cycle with no duplicate address creation or journal posting. No live wallet RPC, wallet credential or funds were used. This is not a public deposit allocator or live deposit processor; mainnet payments remain disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
Validation: TypeScript/Vite build and 144 offline tests passed in the serial native-RandomX test run; the initial parallel run encountered a peer-gossip timeout. Browser smoke verified a disposable wallet's signed test credit, withdrawal hold and cancellation restoring the exact balance, plus a 390px viewport without horizontal overflow. No real funds were used. Tests and remaining acceptance gates are below; this is not launch readiness.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user