Remove markets

docs/consensus-calibration.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Consensus calibration and adversarial analysis — stage 3
 
-**Decision remains NO-GO.** This stage supplies reproducible offline tools and bounded measurements, not new launch parameters, an independent audit or an operational network. Consensus, initial target, genesis, chain identity and approval/payment gates are unchanged.
+**Decision remains NO-GO.** This stage supplies reproducible offline tools and bounded measurements, not new launch parameters, an independent audit or an operational network. Consensus, initial target, genesis, and chain identity are unchanged.
 
 ## Tools and safety boundaries
 
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Wikideck interprets the 256-bit RandomX output as a big-endian integer and accep
 
 The current `0fff…ffff` maximum/initial target requires **16 expected hashes**. The 15-minute setting controls the retarget goal; it does not force miners to wait 15 minutes before submitting an initially easy block. For a specified integer network rate H and goal S seconds, the analysis computes `floor(2^256 / (H*S)) - 1`, bounded by the existing allowed target range. This formula assumes stable aggregate honest work and does not choose a safe launch rate, security budget, or rounding-independent exact interval.
 
-The report also includes `(q/(1-q))^z` for q < 0.5 (1 for q >= 0.5), under an idealized fixed-difficulty Poisson race with attacker share q and a **known current deficit** of z blocks. This is the probability of ever catching up under those assumptions, **not** double-spend probability after z observed confirmations: attacker progress during confirmation waiting is not modeled. There is no network latency, eclipse, selfish mining, timestamp manipulation, adaptive difficulty, economic cost or attack detection model. Do not derive a payment finality policy from this table.
+The report also includes `(q/(1-q))^z` for q < 0.5 (1 for q >= 0.5), under an idealized fixed-difficulty Poisson race with attacker share q and a **known current deficit** of z blocks. This is the probability of ever catching up under those assumptions, **not** a guarantee that a block is final: attacker progress while a block accumulates confirmations is not modeled. There is no network latency, eclipse, selfish mining, timestamp manipulation, adaptive difficulty, economic cost or attack detection model.
 
 ## Local native measurement (2026-10-20)
 
@@ -57,6 +57,6 @@ Before production calibration can be approved:
 - Establish credible aggregate honest hashrate, launch ramp/surge/drop ranges and attack/rewrite cost assumptions; independently review target choice and the inherited ten-block/clamped endpoint retarget, including gaps across windows and timestamp attacks.
 - Add stochastic mining/partition/clock/adaptive-hashpower models and sustained multi-host rehearsals with valid reference proofs, full state commitments, mempool/reorg persistence, networking and realistic resource pressure.
 - Freeze reviewed rules and actual genesis date with a new identity where required. Publish the manifest/artifact hashes and obtain independent review and explicit operator sign-off. Do not patch an active chain's rules in place.
-- Decide payment holds/reserves/disputes independently; ten confirmations cannot be sold as absolute finality on an unbootstrapped PoW chain. Real payments remain blocked.
+- Document reorganization and confirmation limitations honestly; no finite confirmation count is absolute finality on this unbootstrapped PoW chain.
 
 See [security review](security-review.md), [launch evidence register](operator-launch.md) and the read-only preflight. The calibration blocker remains open.