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Eric Meehan 2026-02-07 11:36:54 -05:00
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docker-mailserver/certs/*.pem
docker-mailserver/config/dovecot-quotas.cf
docker-mailserver/config/ssl/*
docker-mailserver/mail/*
docker-mailserver/transport
tor/data/*

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!!! Work in Progress !!!
# Hidden Mailserver
This repository deploys a simple SMTP server on the Tor network using Docker containers for the purpose of self-hosting
anonymous and end-to-end encrypted email communications without a public domain name or opening ports on one's router.
It is based on the instructions provided by [ehloonion/onionmx](https://github.com/ehloonion/onionmx/tree/master), and is
designed to be as easy as possible to deploy.
The goal of this project is to allow individuals to communicate with as much privacy and security as possible. If you and
your friend each deploy this and share your .onion email addresses, your subsequent correspondance would be virtually
untraceable. Clearnet email providers will reject mail from servers lacking authentication from DNS records, so this is
primarily intended for interpersonal communications between trusted parties.
## Requirements
* Linux or MacOS (PRs welcome for Windows support)
* 2GB RAM (minimum)
* 2GB available storage for your emails (bare minimum)
* Internet connection
* [Docker](https://www.docker.com/)
* Sudo privileges to change the ownership of directories within this repository (read ```startup.sh```)
## Usage
1. Add known .onion addresses to the ```known_servers``` file, one per line
2. Run the startup script
```
./startup.sh
```
3. Create an initial email account (pseudonyms are more secure)
```
docker compose exec mailserver setup email create {{ your_username }}@{{ your_onion_service }}.onion
```
4. Configure your email client to use a SOCKS5 proxy
5. Import the CA cert into your email client
6. Login with POP3 using an email client
7. Configure GPG in your client (optional but highly recommended)
## Security
You are encouraged to read ```startup.sh```, ```docker-compose.yaml```, and the provided configuration files. This repository
utilizes well-known Docker containers ([mailserver/docker-mailserver](https://hub.docker.com/r/mailserver/docker-mailserver)
and [dockurr/tor](https://hub.docker.com/r/dockurr/tor)) with minimal configurations to achieve SMTP over Tor. Most users
should be able to verify the contents of this repository themselves, and are encouraged to do so.
The startup script will generate keys for encrypting mail on disk; however, it stores these keys alongside the encrypted data
all within this repository. You are highly encouraged to take steps to separate your keys from your data.
The encryption keys created in the startup script encrypts all mail stored on the server. GPG encryption establishes
true end-to-end encryption between the sender and receiver. Configuring GPG encryption in your email client is highly
recommended.
TLS is not used here, and [is not needed](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/advanced/https/).
Beware spoofed email addresses. Usernames can be reused across server instances and .onion addresses can be difficult to
discern by eye. Make sure the person to whom you reply is who you think they are.
Additional restrictions may be desireable in ```docker-mailserver/postfix/master.cf``` and
```docker-mailserver/postfix/main.cf``` (not provided) to ensure the server does not reveal its public IP address by attempting
to send or relay mail over the public internet. Please submit a PR if you have suggestions for a more secure default
configuration.
## Notes
A bridge network with static IPs is defined in ```docker-compose.yaml```. This was done so that container IP addresses could
be hardcoded into ```docker-mailserver/smtp_tor/smtp_tor.sh``` and ```tor/config/torrc```. You can duplicate this repository
in order to host multiple email servers at different .onion addresses from a single machine, which will allow you to maintain
different identities for different purposes; however, the name of the network must be changed between deployments. Edit lines
2, 15, and 30 of ```docker-compose.yaml``` to do this.
You can [use Python to generate a QR code](https://pypi.org/project/qrcode/) an easy way to share your .onion address and GPG
public key with trusted parties.
This application can easily run on modern consumer-grade hardware. While it can be hosted on one's own personal desktop or
even laptop computer, delivery can fail if your server is offline. A Raspberry Pi is an inexpensive option for an always-on
server. The same hardware requirements listed above would apply to a Raspberry Pi (2GB RAM, >2GB storage).

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networks:
hidden_mailserver_network:
driver: bridge
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 172.32.0.0/24
services:
tor:
image: dockurr/tor
container_name: tor
volumes:
- ./tor/config/torrc:/etc/tor/torrc
- ./tor/data:/var/lib/tor
networks:
hidden_mailserver_network:
ipv4_address: 172.32.0.2
restart: always
docker-mailserver:
image: mailserver/docker-mailserver
container_name: mailserver
depends_on:
- tor
volumes:
- ./docker-mailserver/certs:/certs
- ./docker-mailserver/config:/tmp/docker-mailserver
- ./docker-mailserver/dovecot/10-encryption.conf:/etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-encryption.conf
- ./docker-mailserver/mail:/var/mail
- ./docker-mailserver/smtp_tor/smtp_tor.sh:/usr/lib/postfix/sbin/smtp_tor
- ./docker-mailserver/transport:/etc/postfix/transport
- ./docker-mailserver/master.cf:/etc/postfix/master.cf
networks:
hidden_mailserver_network:
ipv4_address: 172.32.0.3
restart: always
command:
- "/bin/bash"
- "-c"
- "apt-get update -y && apt-get install -y torsocks && echo 'AllowInbound 1' >> /etc/tor/torsocks.conf && chown root:root /usr/lib/postfix/sbin/smtp_tor && chown root:root /etc/postfix/transport && postmap /etc/postfix/transport && supervisord -c /etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf"
environment:
- "ENABLE_POP3=1"
- "OVERRIDE_HOSTNAME=mail.${HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS}"
- "POSTMASTER_ADDRESS=postmaster@${HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS}"
- "SSL_TYPE=self-signed"

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test@tokrtmlmfhkt63yb5z2d6mrcphfi5gdawblnxjz3menmu72dtttj2iad.onion|{SHA512-CRYPT}$6$mu78dupB2eQWSa9s$eISjUVt9p9xZa2kpkEMoH72dj3pSS9VmRqreN1mkAgs2NzgwTZbTzZCB.iyyUP3/s6.uZ9zUr/9eJF4yvTuon/

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transport_maps = hash:/etc/postfix/transport

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# Enables mail_crypt for all services (imap, pop3, etc)
mail_plugins = $mail_plugins mail_crypt
plugin {
mail_crypt_global_private_key = </certs/privkey.pem
mail_crypt_global_public_key = </certs/pubkey.pem
mail_crypt_save_version = 2
}

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#
# Postfix master process configuration file. For details on the format
# of the file, see the master(5) manual page (command: "man 5 master" or
# on-line: http://www.postfix.org/master.5.html).
#
# Do not forget to execute "postfix reload" after editing this file.
#
# ==========================================================================
# service type private unpriv chroot wakeup maxproc command + args
# (yes) (yes) (no) (never) (100)
# ==========================================================================
smtp inet n - n - 1 postscreen
smtpd pass - - n - - smtpd
tlsproxy unix - - n - 0 tlsproxy
dnsblog unix - - n - 0 dnsblog
submission inet n - n - - smtpd
-o syslog_name=postfix/submission
-o smtpd_tls_security_level=encrypt
-o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
-o smtpd_sasl_type=dovecot
-o smtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient=no
-o smtpd_sasl_authenticated_header=yes
-o smtpd_client_restrictions=permit_sasl_authenticated,reject
-o smtpd_relay_restrictions=permit_sasl_authenticated,reject
-o smtpd_sender_restrictions=$mua_sender_restrictions
-o smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=
-o milter_macro_daemon_name=ORIGINATING
-o cleanup_service_name=sender-cleanup
submissions inet n - n - - smtpd
-o syslog_name=postfix/submissions
-o smtpd_tls_wrappermode=yes
-o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
-o smtpd_sasl_type=dovecot
-o smtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient=no
-o smtpd_sasl_authenticated_header=yes
-o smtpd_client_restrictions=permit_sasl_authenticated,reject
-o smtpd_relay_restrictions=permit_sasl_authenticated,reject
-o smtpd_sender_restrictions=$mua_sender_restrictions
-o smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=
-o milter_macro_daemon_name=ORIGINATING
-o cleanup_service_name=sender-cleanup
pickup fifo n - n 60 1 pickup
-o content_filter=
-o receive_override_options=no_header_body_checks
# This relates to submission(s) services defined above:
# https://www.postfix.org/BUILTIN_FILTER_README.html#mx_submission
sender-cleanup unix n - n - 0 cleanup
-o syslog_name=postfix/sender-cleanup
-o header_checks=pcre:/etc/postfix/maps/sender_header_filter.pcre
cleanup unix n - n - 0 cleanup
qmgr unix n - n 300 1 qmgr
tlsmgr unix - - n 1000? 1 tlsmgr
rewrite unix - - n - - trivial-rewrite
bounce unix - - n - 0 bounce
defer unix - - n - 0 bounce
trace unix - - n - 0 bounce
verify unix - - n - 1 verify
flush unix n - n 1000? 0 flush
proxymap unix - - n - - proxymap
proxywrite unix - - n - 1 proxymap
smtp unix - - n - - smtp
relay unix - - n - - smtp
showq unix n - n - - showq
error unix - - n - - error
retry unix - - n - - error
discard unix - - n - - discard
local unix - n n - - local
virtual unix - n n - - virtual
lmtp unix - - n - - lmtp
anvil unix - - n - 1 anvil
scache unix - - n - 1 scache
postlog unix-dgram n - n - 1 postlogd
smtptor unix - - n - - smtp_tor
-o smtp_dns_support_level=disabled
-o smtp_tls_security_level=none
policyd-spf unix - n n - 0 spawn
user=policyd-spf argv=/usr/bin/policyd-spf
#
# Amavis configuration
#
smtp-amavis unix - - n - 2 smtp
-o syslog_name=postfix/$service_name
-o smtp_data_done_timeout=1200
-o smtp_send_xforward_command=yes
-o disable_dns_lookups=yes
-o max_use=20
-o smtp_tls_security_level=none
-o smtp_tls_wrappermode=no
127.0.0.1:10025 inet n - n - - smtpd
-o syslog_name=postfix/smtpd-amavis
-o content_filter=
-o local_recipient_maps=
-o relay_recipient_maps=
-o smtpd_restriction_classes=
-o smtpd_delay_reject=no
-o smtpd_client_restrictions=permit_mynetworks,reject
-o smtpd_helo_restrictions=
-o smtpd_sender_restrictions=
-o smtpd_recipient_restrictions=permit_mynetworks,reject
-o smtpd_data_restrictions=reject_unauth_pipelining
-o smtpd_end_of_data_restrictions=
-o mynetworks=127.0.0.0/8
-o smtpd_error_sleep_time=0
-o smtpd_soft_error_limit=1001
-o smtpd_hard_error_limit=1000
-o smtpd_client_connection_count_limit=0
-o smtpd_client_connection_rate_limit=0
-o receive_override_options=no_header_body_checks,no_unknown_recipient_checks,no_milters
-o smtp_tls_security_level=none

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#!/bin/sh
/usr/bin/torsocks -i --address 172.18.0.2 --port 9050 /usr/lib/postfix/sbin/smtp "$@"

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eom.dev n4gvlcphj4fshmga42zea3gjxicsyrgbh6hcpnldjdj7r64ehmpsf4id.onion

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#!/bin/bash
export HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS="this is set to suppress an irrelevant warning"
docker compose down

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#!/bin/bash
# Create a dummy tor instance to generate keys and hostname if needed
# !!! SUDO IS USED HERE TO SEE IF A FILE OWNED BY 100:100 IN THIS REPO EXISTS !!!
if ! sudo [ -e ./tor/data/docker-mailserver/hostname ]
then
echo "Setting up Tor hidden service..."
mkdir -p ./tor/{config,data}
# !!! SUDO IS USED HERE TO CHANGE THE OWNERSHIP OF TOR'S DATA DIRECTORY SO THAT IT CAN BE USED BY THE CONTAINER !!!
sudo chown -R 100:100 ./tor/data
docker run -d --rm --name tor -v ./tor/data:/var/lib/tor -v ./tor/config:/etc/tor dockurr/tor
echo "Waiting for service to initialize..."
sleep 5
docker stop tor
echo "Finished setting up Tor hidden service."
else
echo "Using existing Tor hidden service configuration."
fi
# Get hidden service address
# !!! SUDO IS USED HERE TO READ THE ONION HOSTNAME FROM A FILE SET TO BE OWNED BY USER 100 IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION !!!
# TODO: Find a way to do this without sudo!
export HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS="$(sudo cat ./tor/data/docker-mailserver/hostname)"
# Generate transport maps
echo "Creating transport map..."
# !!! SUDO IS USED HERE TO CLEAR ANY EXISTING TRANSPORT MAPS !!!
# !!! SUDO IS NOT USED ANYWHERE ELSE IN THIS SCRIPT !!!
sudo rm ./docker-mailserver/transport
echo "$HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS smtp:[127.0.0.1]" > ./docker-mailserver/transport
while read -r pseudonym onion
do
echo "$pseudonym smtptor:[$onion]" >> ./docker-mailserver/transport
done < known_servers
echo "* discard" >> ./docker-mailserver/transport
echo "Done creating transport map."
# Generate keys for encrypted storage if needed
if ! [ -e ./docker-mailserver/certs/pubkey.pem ] || ! [ -e ./docker-mailserver/certs/privkey.pem ]
then
echo "Creating encryption keys..."
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey| openssl pkey -out ./docker-mailserver/certs/privkey.pem
openssl pkey -in ./docker-mailserver/certs/privkey.pem -pubout -out ./docker-mailserver/certs/pubkey.pem
echo "Finished creating encryption keys."
else
echo "Using existing encryption keys."
fi
# Generate SSL certificates if needed
if ! [ -e ./docker-mailserver/config/ssl/demoCA/cacert.pem ]
then
echo "Creating SSL certificates..."
docker run -d --rm --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" -v ./docker-mailserver/config/ssl:/tmp/step-ca/ --workdir /tmp/step-ca \
--entrypoint /tmp/step-ca/generate-certs.sh -e HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS=$HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS smallstep/step-ca
echo "Finished creating SSL certificates."
else
echo "Using existing SSL certificates."
fi
# Start the containers
echo "Starting containers..."
docker compose up -d
echo "Finished starting containers."
echo "Hidden service address: $HIDDEN_SERVICE_ADDRESS"

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SocksPort 0.0.0.0:9050
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 28 February 2019 for Tor 0.3.5.1-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-editing-torrc/
## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
#SOCKSPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SOCKSPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SOCKSPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SOCKSPolicy accept6 FC00::/7
#SOCKSPolicy reject *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
#Log notice syslog
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
#ControlPort 9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/docker-mailserver
HiddenServicePort 25 172.32.0.3:25
HiddenServicePort 110 172.32.0.3:110
HiddenServicePort 143 172.32.0.3:143
HiddenServicePort 465 172.32.0.3:465
HiddenServicePort 587 172.32.0.3:587
HiddenServicePort 993 172.32.0.3:993
HiddenServicePort 995 172.32.0.3:995
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://community.torproject.org/relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## If you want to listen on IPv6 your numeric address must be explicitly
## between square brackets as follows. You must also listen on IPv4.
#ORPort [2001:DB8::1]:9050
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
## OutboundBindAddressExit will be used for all exit traffic, while
## OutboundBindAddressOR will be used for all OR and Dir connections
## (DNS connections ignore OutboundBindAddress).
## If you do not wish to differentiate, use OutboundBindAddress to
## specify the same address for both in a single line.
#OutboundBindAddressExit 10.0.0.4
#OutboundBindAddressOR 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must
## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
## If not set, "Unnamed" will be used.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 75 kilobytes per second.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not
## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10,
## 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KBytes # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 40 GBytes
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
##
## If you are running multiple relays, you MUST set this option.
##
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators/multiple-relays/
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address.
##
## If you are running multiple relays, you MUST set this option.
##
## Note: do not use MyFamily on bridge relays.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with the default
## exit policy (or whatever exit policy you set below).
## (If ReducedExitPolicy, ExitPolicy, or IPv6Exit are set, relays are exits.
## If none of these options are set, relays are non-exits.)
#ExitRelay 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to allow IPv6 exit traffic.
## (Relays do not allow any exit traffic by default.)
#IPv6Exit 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with a reduced set
## of exit ports.
#ReducedExitPolicy 1
## Uncomment these lines if you want your relay to be an exit, with the
## specified set of exit IPs and ports.
##
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins.
##
## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules
## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and
## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules
## using accept/reject *4.
##
## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a
## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to)
## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators
##
## Look at https://support.torproject.org/abuse/exit-relay-expectations/
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay.
## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow
## "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy accept *4:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy accept6 *6:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
##
## Warning: when running your Tor as a bridge, make sure than MyFamily is
## NOT configured.
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#BridgeDistribution none
## Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
## option with the value being a path. This path can have wildcards. Wildcards are
## expanded first, using lexical order. Then, for each matching file or folder, the following
## rules are followed: if the path is a file, the options from the file will be parsed as if
## they were written where the %include option is. If the path is a folder, all files on that
## folder will be parsed following lexical order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files
## on subfolders are ignored.
## The %include option can be used recursively.
#%include /etc/torrc.d/*.conf